Drafted for discussion, criticism, engagement, modelling, and review. This paper is not legal advice and does not represent any government, political party, Treaty First Nation or Indigenous organization.

Author’s note and purpose of this paper

AI was used extensively and unapologetically in researching, testing, organizing and drafting this version of the paper. The arguments, policy choices and final responsibility for the paper remain the author’s. AI was used as a serious drafting and analytical tool, not as a substitute for independent judgment, expert review, Treaty dialogue or legal advice.

The paper advances a thesis: Saskatchewan should explore a negotiated model of Treaty federalism with participating Treaty First Nations and Canada. The model connects constitutional clarification, genuine self-government, fiscal capacity, early free, prior and informed consent, democratic major-project authorization, and public accountability. Its details are proposals for examination and negotiation, not terms Saskatchewan should impose.

Several mechanisms proposed here, including the Treaty Council, Saskatchewan-specific Equalization accommodation and participation-based approach to interlocutory relief, are policy proposals rather than arrangements established by existing law. They require independent constitutional, Treaty-law, Indigenous-law, fiscal, regulatory, administrative and legislative review.

Executive Summary

Canada is entering a rare period in which Indigenous self-government, provincial authority, fiscal federalism and global investment can be considered together. Federal implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has strengthened the policy commitment to self-determination, self-government, Treaty respect and free, prior and informed consent. Renewed discussion about moving beyond the Indian Act raises a practical constitutional question: what institutions will replace federal administrative structures, and what place will provinces occupy when responsibilities being reorganized intersect provincial jurisdiction?

Saskatchewan has particular reason to engage. It exercises substantial constitutional authority over natural resources, Crown lands, infrastructure, municipalities and provincial services throughout numbered-Treaty territory. Remaining largely on the sidelines risks leaving Saskatchewan as a late entrant into arrangements operating extensively within its borders, while Treaty First Nations encounter Canada as a partner in self-government and Saskatchewan principally when the Province wishes to develop resources, regulate Crown lands or defend decisions in court.

The proposed operating principle is Honour Among Nations. Canada would retain federal jurisdiction, Treaty responsibilities and continuing fiscal obligations. Saskatchewan would retain provincial jurisdiction. Participating Treaty First Nations would exercise inherent, recognized and negotiated governmental authority. Where responsibilities overlap, governments would negotiate institutional arrangements instead of treating Treaty First Nations primarily as stakeholders or consultees after principal decisions have been made.

Saskatchewan should first articulate its constitutional position and invite Treaty First Nations and Canada to articulate theirs. If material uncertainty remains, Saskatchewan should consider a carefully framed reference to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. The reference would ask what Saskatchewan’s constitutional place is when it exercises otherwise valid provincial Crown authority in numbered-Treaty territory, rather than asking a court to speak for Treaty First Nations or design the relationship for them.

The proposal is deliberately confined to Treaty First Nations. This is a matter of constitutional discipline rather than exclusion. The numbered Treaties provide an existing constitutional relationship between First Nations and the Crown that predates Saskatchewan and continues within section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Métis, Inuit and non-status Indigenous peoples possess important but distinct histories and constitutional relationships that deserve consideration on their own terms.

The fiscal foundation would be a permanent Treaty Fiscal Assignment equal to 20% of a carefully defined base of qualifying net Saskatchewan Crown natural-resource royalties. For illustration, an annual royalty base of approximately $1.94 billion would produce approximately $388 million at a 20% rate. The figures illustrate scale and mechanics, not a forecast or guaranteed transfer. Revenue should follow responsibility, and responsibility should follow government. Fiscal participation must never purchase consent.

Canada would remain an essential fiscal and constitutional partner. The Treaty Fiscal Assignment would supplement, not replace, federal funding. The parties would negotiate non-offset, stabilization and transitional arrangements. This paper also proposes a Saskatchewan-specific Equalization accommodation: where Saskatchewan permanently assigns 20% of qualifying net Crown resource royalties to participating Treaty governments, Canada should increase Saskatchewan’s applicable natural-resource revenue exclusion from 50% to 60%, recognizing only part of Saskatchewan’s extraordinary fiscal commitment.

A central innovation would be the Saskatchewan Treaty Council, created by statute as a creature of the Legislature and accountable to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. Its principal purpose would be to establish a permanent, transparent and properly resourced structure for pursuing FPIC concerning designated mega-projects and other statutorily defined major initiatives. The Treaty Council would facilitate FPIC; affected Treaty First Nations would determine whether they consent; the Legislature would decide whether Saskatchewan legislates.

For proponents and investors, the value proposition would be greater certainty earlier. An effective Treaty Council would move foundational Treaty, environmental, infrastructure and political questions forward in the investment cycle, while routes, sites, technologies, water requirements, ownership structures, mitigation and benefits can still genuinely change. It would not promise proponents an easier yes. It would provide a more certain answer before billions of dollars are committed.

Every designated mega-project would require bespoke enabling legislation, public committee hearings and an ordinary vote before technical permitting. Saskatchewan would provide adequate notice, relevant information and meaningful opportunities to raise foreseeable objections. Standing, judicial review, constitutional claims and final remedies would remain available. Subject to carefully defined fairness and constitutional exceptions, a party that deliberately declined a meaningful opportunity to raise a foreseeable objection should not ordinarily be able to rely on that same objection later to obtain an interlocutory injunction halting the mega-project.

If an affected Treaty First Nation withheld consent, that decision would remain a no. Saskatchewan could still legislate under ordinary voting rules, but only after the Nation had recorded its reasons, Saskatchewan had responded, unresolved issues had been reconsidered publicly and a permanent Project Decision Record had been created. Saskatchewan would have to own the political and legal consequences of proceeding without consent.

These reforms carry risk, but the relevant comparison is not between reform and a risk-free status quo. Inaction may leave Saskatchewan a constitutional bystander as post-Indian-Act relationships evolve, push Treaty and resource disputes toward courts at the point of maximum conflict, weaken Saskatchewan’s ability to offer reliable institutional pathways for strategic investment and postpone durable Treaty-government fiscal capacity.

1. Why This Discussion Matters Now

Several developments have converged. Canada’s statutory implementation of UNDRIP strengthens the public-policy language of self-determination, self-government and consent. Discussion of the future of Indian Act institutions raises the question of what comes next. Saskatchewan’s autonomy agenda emphasizes provincial jurisdiction and resource development. Canada is simultaneously seeking investment and secure supply chains in critical minerals, energy and strategic resources. These developments should be treated as parts of the same institutional problem.

Moving beyond the Indian Act without defining Saskatchewan’s place in the successor relationship could create a significant long-term constitutional and intergovernmental risk. Questions involving lands, resources, infrastructure, education, health, economic development, policing and other provincial responsibilities cannot prudently be assumed to belong exclusively to an Ottawa–First Nations relationship. If Saskatchewan remains on the sidelines while successor institutions and fiscal relationships are designed, it risks becoming a late entrant into a constitutional relationship operating extensively within its own borders. The relational danger is equally serious: Treaty First Nations could increasingly experience Canada as a partner in self-government while encountering Saskatchewan principally through resource permits, consultation disputes and litigation.

Saskatchewan also has unusual strategic-resource potential. Potash, uranium, oil and gas remain important, while helium and critical minerals increasingly connect the Province to advanced technology, semiconductor manufacturing, medical imaging, aerospace, scientific research, defence and allied supply-chain security. This paper does not depend on a particular commodity forecast. Its point is institutional: as Saskatchewan resources become more strategically important, the quality and durability of Saskatchewan’s relationships with Treaty First Nations become more economically important as well.

The opportunity is not simply to make Saskatchewan more reliable for major-project development. It is to democratize the process through which the Province and Treaty First Nations confront the most consequential resource decisions. The status quo can leave disputes to executive consultation, negotiations outside public view, regulatory proceedings or ultimately the courts. A legislatively created Treaty Council accountable to the Speaker would bring FPIC for designated mega-projects more directly into Saskatchewan’s democratic institutions. Affected Treaty Nations would decide consent; the Council would structure and preserve the process; and elected legislators would own the ultimate provincial decision in public.

2. Completing the Logic of Saskatchewan Autonomy

The Saskatchewan First Act is primarily defensive: it asserts provincial authority while preserving section 35 rights. The missing institutional question is what Saskatchewan does where those two constitutional realities meet. Defensive autonomy asks how Saskatchewan protects its powers from Ottawa. Relational autonomy asks how Saskatchewan exercises those powers honourably when they affect Treaty rights and Treaty citizens.

This is not a proposal for Saskatchewan to acquire Parliament’s section 91(24) authority or place Treaty First Nations under provincial administration. Treaty First Nations should govern themselves. Saskatchewan should govern Saskatchewan matters. Canada should discharge federal responsibilities. Honour Among Nations would provide negotiated rules where those responsibilities intersect.

3. Constitutional Foundation: Authority and Rights Coexist

Section 91(24) assigns Parliament legislative authority over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.” Sections 92 and 92A confer substantial provincial authority, including over property and civil rights, local matters, public lands and natural resources. Section 35 recognizes and affirms existing Aboriginal and Treaty rights. The division of powers identifies legislative authority; section 35 and the honour of the Crown constrain and guide how governmental power is exercised where protected rights are engaged.

No party possesses constitutional exclusivity over the entire relationship. Saskatchewan cannot reduce Treaty rights to a federal inconvenience. Ottawa should not treat section 91(24) as a general supervisory claim over every direct Saskatchewan–Treaty arrangement concerning provincial matters. Treaty rights do not automatically transfer all provincial resource authority to Treaty governments. The challenge is institutional coordination among governments with different, legitimate authority.

Grassy Narrows is an important conceptual anchor because it confirms that a province may exercise relevant Crown authority in Treaty territory while remaining constrained by Treaty limits, section 35 and the honour of the Crown. Haida is important because consultation does not require agreement in every case and because the Court contemplated structured consultation schemes. Tsilhqot’in demonstrates that established Aboriginal title changes the consent and justification analysis. Mikisew cautions against treating the legislative process itself as ordinary administrative action. A serious model must respect these distinctions.

4. A Constitutional Reference as a Gateway, Not a Weapon

Saskatchewan should first publish its constitutional position and invite Canada and Treaty First Nations to respond independently. If political discussions do not produce sufficient clarity, Cabinet could consider a reference to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. A reference is suited to clarification of Saskatchewan’s powers and obligations rather than compensation or an attempt to acquire Treaty rights.

The public rationale must be constitutional clarity. Negotiations should continue before and during the reference. The best outcome may be an agreement reached because every party concludes that institutional design is safer than leaving constitutional boundaries entirely to adjudication.

Saskatchewan must speak only for itself. It should not decide whether the proper Treaty actor is each First Nation, a Treaty grouping, Tribal Council, FSIN, traditional institution or combination. Treaty First Nations would choose independently whether to participate, what positions to advance and through which institutions. Disagreement among Nations is not a defect to be engineered away. It is an expression of self-determination.

Why Treaty First Nations?

The proposed reference and institutional framework are deliberately confined to Saskatchewan’s relationship with Treaty First Nations. This is a principle of constitutional discipline rather than exclusion. The numbered Treaties provide an existing constitutional relationship between First Nations and the Crown that predates Saskatchewan and continues within section 35. Saskatchewan subsequently acquired substantial Crown responsibilities over lands, natural resources and provincial matters. The focused question is what responsibilities accompany Saskatchewan’s exercise of those Crown powers in Treaty territory and what governmental relationship Saskatchewan should establish with Treaty First Nations whose protected rights may be affected.

Attempting to incorporate every Indigenous constitutional relationship into the same reference would complicate the inquiry and risk treating distinct relationships as interchangeable. Métis constitutional rights arise from a different history and body of law. Inuit constitutional relationships largely concern circumstances outside Saskatchewan. Non-status questions raise distinct issues concerning federal jurisdiction, identity and rights. Those relationships deserve serious treatment on their own foundations rather than being appended to a numbered-Treaty model.

Treaty identity may cross provincial borders; provincial delegation does not. A cross-border Treaty Nation can remain one political community while negotiating separately with Saskatchewan, another province and Canada for the powers each actually possesses.

Proposed Reference Questions for Legal Development

1. Does Parliament’s authority under section 91(24) preclude Saskatchewan from entering agreements directly with Treaty First Nations concerning legislative or executive authority otherwise within Saskatchewan’s jurisdiction?

2. When Saskatchewan exercises provincial Crown authority in circumstances materially engaging established Treaty rights, what obligations arise from the honour of the Crown and the applicable Treaty relationship?

3. May Saskatchewan, within valid provincial jurisdiction, recognize and support governmental authority by participating Treaty First Nations through legislation, delegation, fiscal arrangements or intergovernmental agreements without prior federal authorization?

4. How should Saskatchewan’s obligations toward Treaty First Nations interact with federal section 91(24) jurisdiction where both orders of government possess relevant constitutional responsibilities?

5. Honour Among Nations: The Negotiated Architecture

The honour of the Crown remains. Honour Among Nations would complement it as an agreed intergovernmental operating principle among Canada, Saskatchewan and participating Treaty governments. Each government would acknowledge the legitimate rights, jurisdictions and responsibilities of the others; seek negotiated solutions before asserting ultimate power; exchange reasons and evidence when agreement cannot be reached; avoid using fiscal dependence as leverage over rights; and preserve access to courts for genuine legal disputes.

6. The Saskatchewan Treaty Council

The Saskatchewan Treaty Council should be established by statute as a creature of the Legislature and accountable to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. Its principal purpose would be to provide a permanent, transparent and properly resourced institutional structure for pursuing FPIC in relation to designated mega-projects and other major initiatives meeting objective statutory thresholds. The Council would not possess legislative authority, exercise a veto on behalf of Treaty First Nations or constitute a second chamber. Rather, it would facilitate and document FPIC so affected Treaty Nations can make informed decisions and the Legislative Assembly can make its ultimate decisions on a complete public record.

The Council’s functions could include maintaining agreed procedures for identifying potentially affected rights-holders; commissioning or facilitating independent technical work; providing stable legal, economic, environmental and engineering capacity; establishing project-specific Affected Treaty Nations Panels; maintaining a public registry; monitoring negotiated conditions; and reporting to the Legislature. Its structure must be co-designed and Treaty participation voluntary.

The Council must not centralize consent. It could certify that an agreed process was followed, but could not substitute a province-wide vote for the decisions of affected rights-holding Nations. Affected-Nation identification disputes should be handled through agreed expedited processes.

Why Proponents Should Support the Treaty Council

Properly designed, the Treaty Council would provide an important benefit to proponents: greater certainty before very large and potentially irreversible capital commitments are made. Constitutional uncertainty and unresolved relationships with affected Treaty First Nations are difficult to price. If those issues emerge only after hundreds of millions of dollars have been committed to land, engineering, financing or construction, delay, redesign and litigation can become enormously costly.

The Council would move those questions forward in the investment cycle. Before a proponent commits billions, it would have a defined process for identifying potentially affected Treaty First Nations, disclosing the project concept, considering Indigenous knowledge and technical evidence, examining reasonable alternatives and determining whether affected Nations provide, condition or withhold consent. The objective is not guaranteed approval. It is greater certainty earlier, while projects can still change.

A consistent process and robust record could also reduce reliance on late-stage litigation by isolating genuine legal issues from political or technical disagreement. Rights and access to courts remain intact. The investment bargain is more work and disclosure at the beginning in exchange for a clearer and potentially more durable pathway before most capital is committed.

7. Negotiating Real Self-Government

The purpose of the Treaty Partnership is not a larger administrative program. It is governments capable of making law, managing revenue, delivering or purchasing services, planning for future generations and being accountable to their citizens. Responsibilities must be negotiated rather than assumed to follow automatically from the 20% fiscal assignment.

The legal mechanism can differ by field. Some authority may be inherent or recognized Indigenous jurisdiction and should not be described as a provincial gift. Saskatchewan may delegate defined provincial powers where appropriate. Governments may also create concurrent or coordinated regimes. Participation and pace should be voluntary, with entry, amendment and withdrawal rules protecting citizens and service continuity.

8. Existing Saskatchewan Institutions Show Coexistence Is Possible

First Nations University of Canada and the Saskatchewan Indian Institute of Technologies demonstrate that First Nations-led governance and provincial recognition can coexist without provincial control. They are not templates for Treaty self-government, but they show that autonomy, recognition, credential portability and integration can be compatible. They also point toward the human-capital partnerships that stronger Treaty governments would require.

9. The Boundary Problem

Numbered-Treaty territories do not align neatly with provincial borders. Saskatchewan cannot delegate another province’s powers and should not imply that Treaty identity ends at Saskatchewan’s boundary. Citizen-based responsibilities may be more portable than place-based powers such as land-use regulation, permitting, policing and Crown-land administration. The practical rule remains: Treaty identity crosses provincial borders; provincial delegation does not.

10. The Treaty Fiscal Assignment

Saskatchewan should consider permanently assigning 20% of qualifying net Crown natural-resource royalties to participating Treaty governments. The assignment should be understood as fiscal capacity accompanying government, not compensation for rights, a price for consent, a discretionary program or a charitable transfer.

For illustrative purposes, a combined annual royalty base of approximately $1.94 billion from oil and gas, potash and uranium would produce a Treaty Fiscal Assignment of approximately $388 million at the proposed 20% rate. The figures demonstrate scale and mechanics rather than establish a forecast or guaranteed funding level. Actual transfers would fluctuate with commodity prices, production, royalty structures, deductions, credits and the statutory definition of qualifying revenues.

The base must be transparent and audited. Negotiations would define qualifying revenues, accounting treatment, adjustments and future resource streams. The central principle is that revenue follows responsibility, and responsibility follows government. No responsibility should move without sufficient fiscal capacity and transition planning; nor should the fiscal assignment be defended as self-government if the same administrative arrangements continue indefinitely.

Fiscal Firewall: Funding Is Not Consent

The Treaty Fiscal Assignment must be legally and institutionally separated from FPIC. A Treaty government receiving its fiscal share remains entirely free to approve, condition or reject a designated mega-project. Saskatchewan must not threaten, suspend or reduce fiscal transfers because consent is withheld. Project benefits, equity and fiscal-government arrangements should be governed separately.

11. Costing Responsibilities Before Transferring Them

The 20% figure cannot substitute for expenditure analysis. For each proposed field, the parties should identify existing federal, provincial and Treaty-government spending, own-source revenues, administrative costs, unmet needs, capital deficits, workforce requirements and transition costs. The arrangement should be built from negotiated responsibilities and needs, not reverse-engineered to fit a politically attractive transfer.

Operating government, capital infrastructure and intergenerational savings should be distinguished. Public reporting should show what responsibility moved with funding, what service standard applies, who is accountable and how disputes are resolved. The aim is to avoid both unfunded mandates and permanent duplication of administrations.

12. Canada as Fiscal Partner and Guarantor

The Treaty Fiscal Assignment would supplement, not replace, federal funding. Canada should not reduce its contribution dollar for dollar simply because Saskatchewan has entered the relationship. If Saskatchewan loses royalty revenue while Ottawa saves an equal amount, Treaty governments gain little net capacity and Saskatchewan has no rational incentive to participate.

A negotiated Treaty Fiscal Non-Offset Covenant should therefore protect the integrity of Saskatchewan’s contribution, while allowing the parties to review changing responsibilities, taxation, own-source revenues and investment income over time. Resource revenues are volatile; the parties should negotiate appropriate stabilization arrangements and the role Canada should play in protecting continuity of essential responsibilities.

Canada receives value in return: practical implementation of self-government, stronger Treaty institutions, reduced program administration over time and a clearer environment for nationally significant infrastructure and resource development. Federal participation is part of workable post-Indian-Act federalism.

13. A Saskatchewan-Specific Equalization Arrangement

The Treaty Fiscal Assignment would represent an unusual fiscal commitment by Saskatchewan and should be accompanied by a deliberate federal fiscal response. Under the current policy architecture, natural-resource revenues receive distinctive treatment in Equalization. This paper proposes a Saskatchewan-specific modification as part of the broader Honour Among Nations compact.

Where Saskatchewan permanently assigns 20% of qualifying net Crown natural-resource royalties to participating Treaty governments, Canada should increase Saskatchewan’s natural-resource revenue exclusion used in the applicable Equalization calculation from 50% to 60%. Put differently, 40% rather than 50% of Saskatchewan’s qualifying natural-resource revenues would be included for that calculation.

The additional ten-percentage-point exclusion would recognize that Saskatchewan no longer retains the full fiscal benefit of the resource revenues being measured. Treating Saskatchewan as though those revenues remained entirely available to the Province would fail to recognize the fiscal restructuring the Treaty Fiscal Assignment is intended to accomplish.

The proposal is deliberately asymmetrical. It does not suggest every province should automatically receive the same treatment. The accommodation would arise from a specific bargain: Saskatchewan permanently surrenders a defined share of resource revenues to support Treaty governments, and Canada recognizes part of that commitment through federal fiscal policy. If Saskatchewan discontinued the Treaty Fiscal Assignment, the rationale for the additional exclusion would disappear.

Canadian federalism is capable of asymmetrical fiscal arrangements. Quebec offers an important illustration of durable differentiation in Canadian fiscal federalism. The point is not that Saskatchewan’s circumstances are constitutionally identical to Quebec’s. They are not. The relevance is that federalism need not require perfect institutional symmetry where history, governmental responsibility and legitimate national interests justify a different arrangement.

The Saskatchewan case rests on its own foundation. Treaty First Nations’ political communities and Crown relationships predate Saskatchewan. Their nationhood endured federal policies that often sought assimilation and weakened Indigenous institutions, cultures and languages. The relevant point is not to rank historical experiences, but to recognize the survival and renewal of political communities whose relationship with the Crown forms part of Canada’s constitutional order.

Canada’s United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act provides an additional policy rationale. A fiscal arrangement supporting durable Treaty-government capacity could give practical institutional expression to federal commitments concerning Indigenous self-determination and self-government. The paper does not suggest that the Act legally compels this specific Equalization treatment. It argues that the accommodation would be a coherent federal policy response to an initiative advancing those objectives.

There is deliberate proportionality in the proposal. Saskatchewan would assign 20% of qualifying net Crown resource royalties but seek only an additional ten-percentage-point exclusion. Canada would recognize only part of Saskatchewan’s commitment, leaving Saskatchewan with a substantial net fiscal contribution.

The Interests of Other Provinces

Other provinces have a legitimate interest because changes in measured fiscal capacity can affect the operation of Equalization. Those effects should be independently modelled before implementation. That does not mean every negotiated accommodation must be offered identically to every province. Other provinces remain free to pursue arrangements suited to their own constitutional, Treaty and historical circumstances.

The broader question is not whether Saskatchewan deserves a special favour. It is whether federal fiscal arrangements should recognize a province that voluntarily restructures part of its resource wealth to support meaningful Treaty self-government. A Saskatchewan-specific 50%-to-60% natural-resource exclusion would represent Canadian federalism adapting its fiscal arrangements to a distinctive constitutional relationship.

14. The Treaty Generations Fund

Participating Treaty governments should be enabled to create a Treaty Generations Fund capable of converting finite-resource wealth into diversified intergenerational assets and smoothing volatility. The Fund must belong to and be designed by Treaty governments. Professional investment management, citizen accountability, conflict controls, prudent withdrawal rules and transparency are possible design principles, but the detailed arrangements properly belong to negotiation.

15. FPIC as Front-End Project Risk Management

Canada’s major-project problem is not simply the number of approvals. It is the stage at which fundamental disagreement becomes visible. Projects can accumulate land, engineering, financing expectations and political momentum before their most serious Treaty, environmental, water, power or community issues are understood. Early FPIC moves expensive disagreement forward, while routes, sites, scale, water use, power sources, ownership and mitigation remain adaptable.

The model should not promise that every project will be faster. It should promise a better sequence. The objective is not the fastest route to an application; it is the shortest credible route to durable authorization. More structured work early can be preferable to discovering the same disagreement after large sunk costs.

16. Designated Mega-Projects and Bespoke Enabling Legislation

Saskatchewan should distinguish ordinary development from designated mega-projects through objective statutory triggers. Potential triggers include capital scale, extraordinary electricity or water demand, major Crown-land footprint, cross-municipal impacts, strategic-resource significance, major public infrastructure requirements, emissions or reclamation exposure and material effects on Treaty rights. Designation should not depend solely on Cabinet discretion.

Every designated mega-project would require its own enabling Act. The Act would authorize the project in principle, define the approved concept, record political conditions and allocate public responsibilities. It would not constitute an environmental, engineering, occupational-safety, utility or operating permit. Technical regulators would retain their statutory duties.

The bill would proceed through full committee hearings. The proponent, affected Treaty Nations, host and neighbouring municipalities, utilities, regulators, landowners, technical experts, labour, civil-society organizations and members of the public could present evidence. A material-change rule would require renewed legislative and Treaty consideration where the project materially exceeds the authorized concept.

Early Participation and Interlocutory Relief

The designated mega-project process should operate on reciprocal procedural responsibility. Saskatchewan must provide legitimate interested parties with reasonable notice, relevant information and a meaningful opportunity to identify concerns before legislative authorization. In return, parties seeking to preserve the possibility of extraordinary interlocutory relief should ordinarily be expected to raise reasonably foreseeable concerns while the project remains capable of modification.

Nothing in the enabling legislation should remove standing, prevent judicial review, restrict a Treaty First Nation from asserting a section 35 right or prevent an appropriate final remedy where unlawful government action is established. The Legislature should, however, distinguish access to judicial review from eligibility for interlocutory relief.

Subject to constitutionally required and fairness-based exceptions, a party that received adequate notice, had reasonable access to the information necessary to identify its concern, had a meaningful opportunity to participate and nevertheless elected not to raise a reasonably foreseeable objection should ordinarily be precluded from obtaining an interlocutory injunction based substantially on that same objection. Exceptions should protect inadequate notice, withheld or newly discovered information, material project change, newly arising issues, unavailable meaningful participation or subsequent governmental departure from statutory conditions.

Participation would not guarantee an injunction. It would preserve eligibility to ask for that extraordinary remedy under the applicable legal test. Courts would remain available to correct legal and constitutional wrongs, but interlocutory relief should not ordinarily become a strategic substitute for meaningful participation deliberately declined earlier.

17. What Happens When Consent Is Withheld?

Consent withheld cannot be renamed consultation completed, deemed consent or administrative compliance. At the same time, this proposal does not alter the Legislature’s ordinary voting rules or claim that every Treaty government holds an automatic legal veto over all provincial legislation.

A no-consent determination would trigger a Reconsideration and Reasons Process. Affected Treaty Nations would table reasons identifying rights engaged, anticipated effects, disputed evidence, rejected alternatives and inadequate accommodations. Saskatchewan would provide a point-by-point response. Committee hearings could reopen and supplemental evidence be required.

The Assembly would then debate the unresolved issues and vote under ordinary rules. If it proceeded, the public record would state plainly that consent was withheld. The Nation would retain its legal rights and remedies. A consolidated Project Decision Record would preserve the consent determination, Treaty reasons, provincial response, committee record, amendments, legislative disposition and technical conditions.

FPIC determines whether Nations agree. The Legislature determines whether Saskatchewan legislates. Courts determine whether legally reviewable conduct complies with law.

18. Municipalities, Utilities and Local Democracy

Municipalities should not bear primary political responsibility for province-scale projects whose water, energy, fiscal, environmental and Treaty implications exceed municipal boundaries. Bespoke provincial legislation would move ultimate authorization to the Legislature while guaranteeing municipal standing.

Host and neighbouring municipalities should receive timely access to relevant technical information, have a formal role in legislative committee hearings, and retain the ability to commission their own independent analysis where necessary. They should be able to negotiate enforceable agreements addressing roads, emergency services, water, wastewater, policing, housing, taxation and other material municipal impacts. Municipal evidence should be formally addressed in the Project Decision Record rather than treated as a local obstacle to a predetermined decision.

Utilities should be full institutional participants where power, water or transmission capacity is material. Enabling legislation should identify public-infrastructure obligations, cost allocation and risks to existing ratepayers.

19. The Stakeholder Bargain

The proposal is defensible only if it acknowledges losses and risks honestly. It is a negotiated compact, not a moral demand that one party surrender while others retain unlimited discretion.

20. UNDRIP Alignment

The Treaty Partnership is not an alternative to UNDRIP. It is a proposed way of giving self-determination, representative institutions, fiscal capacity and FPIC practical expression within Saskatchewan. Political authority without fiscal capacity can reproduce dependency; consultation after project design can reproduce powerlessness even when procedurally elaborate.

The Treaty Council would not replace representative institutions of individual Nations. Project consent would remain with affected rights-holding Nations acting through institutions they choose. Free requires absence of fiscal coercion; prior requires engagement before authorization and practical irreversibility; informed requires relevant evidence, time and independent capacity; consent means an actual yes, conditional yes, or no.

21. Measures of Success

Success should be judged by co-designed measures rather than rhetoric. Governance measures might include transparent budgeting and audit, citizen participation, service standards, dispute-resolution performance and institutional capacity. Fiscal measures might examine revenue stability, administrative duplication, capital conditions and long-term investment performance. Project measures might examine the stage at which material concerns are identified, substantial redesign, time from concept to durable authorization, litigation exposure, compliance and municipal costs. An early decision not to proceed can be successful risk management rather than failure.

22. Why Saskatchewan Should Lead

Saskatchewan combines extensive numbered-Treaty geography, substantial natural-resource revenues, strategic-resource opportunities and a need for global capital. Demographically and economically, stronger First Nations government, education, enterprise and participation are central to Saskatchewan’s future. A province able to show early Treaty engagement, transparent legislative authorization, credible environmental governance and Indigenous economic participation could turn a source of perceived project risk into institutional advantage.

23. The Costs and Risks of Doing Nothing

The proposals in this paper carry constitutional, fiscal, political and administrative risk. The appropriate comparison, however, is not between a complex proposal and a risk-free status quo. Choosing not to develop new institutions is itself a policy choice with costs, risks and foregone opportunities.

Saskatchewan Risks Becoming a Constitutional Bystander

If Saskatchewan remains largely outside discussions concerning successor relationships to the Indian Act, provincial authority does not disappear. The risk is that governmental and fiscal relationships are negotiated principally between Canada and First Nations, leaving Saskatchewan to accommodate arrangements it played little role in designing. Relationally, Treaty First Nations could increasingly encounter Canada as a partner in self-government and Saskatchewan mainly when the Province asserts authority over lands and resources.

Treaty Relationships May Continue to Be Defined Through Disputes

The absence of permanent institutions does not prevent disagreement; it influences where disagreement is resolved. Courts remain necessary for genuine legal disputes, but litigation is retrospective and can begin after decisions, investments and political commitments have hardened. The Treaty Council attempts to move disagreement forward, when alternatives remain available.

Saskatchewan Could Lose an Economic Advantage

Saskatchewan’s strategic resources increasingly connect it to food security, energy security, advanced technology and allied supply chains. Maintaining the status quo leaves proponents navigating foundational Treaty risk project by project. A credible democratic FPIC architecture could become part of Saskatchewan’s investment proposition by identifying consequential risks before most capital is committed.

Continued Fiscal Dependence Carries Costs of Its Own

Rejecting the Treaty Fiscal Assignment because it carries fiscal risk does not eliminate public expenditure or the need for government. It preserves existing arrangements. The alternative asks whether durable governmental revenue, matched with negotiated responsibility and direct accountability to Treaty citizens, can build stronger long-term institutional capacity.

Political Mistrust and Demographic Opportunity

Relationships repeatedly conducted through consultation disputes, litigation and project-specific negotiation can entrench mistrust. Permanent institutions cannot manufacture trust, but they can create repeated opportunities to negotiate, disagree openly and understand responsibility. Delay also carries demographic and economic opportunity costs for Saskatchewan, whose future prosperity is inseparable from First Nations education, entrepreneurship, employment and governmental capacity.

The Status Quo May Ultimately Be the Riskier Choice

None of these arguments proves that every proposal should be adopted. They establish that the status quo must be scrutinized as seriously as reform. Doing nothing avoids some immediate political and fiscal risk, but preserves existing uncertainties and allows Saskatchewan’s constitutional and economic environment to be shaped incrementally by events, litigation and negotiations occurring elsewhere. The question is not whether Honour Among Nations is without risk. It is whether Canada, Saskatchewan and Treaty First Nations can construct something more durable than the arrangements they would otherwise inherit by default.

Conclusion: From Managing Overlap to Building a Treaty Federation

The status quo separates questions that increasingly belong together. Saskatchewan discusses autonomy without a permanent Treaty-government interface. Canada discusses UNDRIP and movement beyond the Indian Act without a clearly defined provincial role. Treaty First Nations pursue self-government while durable fiscal capacity remains contested. Industry seeks project certainty while foundational Treaty, environmental and infrastructure issues can become fully visible only after substantial commitments have been made. Honour Among Nations proposes that Saskatchewan confront these questions as parts of the same institutional challenge.

The proposal begins with a restrained constitutional proposition: Saskatchewan should determine its legitimate place within a Treaty relationship that already exists. It should not speak for Treaty First Nations, absorb their governments into provincial jurisdiction or replace Canada’s responsibilities. Nor should it accept that federal jurisdiction leaves Saskatchewan without a meaningful Treaty relationship when the Province itself exercises Crown authority throughout numbered-Treaty territory.

Participating Treaty First Nations should have the opportunity to exercise meaningful governmental responsibilities supported by durable fiscal capacity. Saskatchewan would permanently assign 20% of qualifying net Crown natural-resource royalties while Canada remained a fiscal partner. A Saskatchewan-specific Equalization accommodation increasing the applicable natural-resource revenue exclusion from 50% to 60% would recognize part of Saskatchewan’s extraordinary commitment while leaving the Province with a meaningful net contribution.

The Treaty Council, created by statute as a creature of the Legislature and accountable to the Speaker, would provide a permanent FPIC structure. The Treaty Council facilitates FPIC. Treaty First Nations decide whether they consent. The Legislature decides whether Saskatchewan legislates. This division would democratize decisions too often concentrated in executive consultation, private negotiation, regulatory proceedings and litigation.

For proponents, the value proposition is greater certainty earlier. For potential opponents, reciprocal responsibility means Saskatchewan must provide meaningful notice and opportunity while a party that deliberately bypasses that opportunity should not ordinarily retain access to extraordinary interlocutory relief based on the same foreseeable objection. Genuine judicial review and constitutional remedies remain.

This does not diminish the courts. Governments should negotiate governmental relationships. Treaty Nations should determine their positions. Legislatures should make difficult political decisions publicly. Regulators should determine technical compliance. Courts should decide genuine questions of legality and constitutional rights. Honour Among Nations is not the absence of disagreement; it is the decision to create institutions strong enough to contain disagreement without turning every dispute into a constitutional crisis.

There is another option: Saskatchewan can do nothing. Doing nothing avoids some immediate risk, but it may leave Saskatchewan reacting as Canada and First Nations reshape post-Indian-Act relationships, preserve project-by-project Treaty uncertainty, postpone durable Treaty-government fiscal capacity and continue to make courts one of the principal institutions through which the relationship is clarified. Doing nothing is neither neutral nor costless.

This paper does not claim that every mechanism will survive legal review, negotiation or political debate unchanged. Some should change when Treaty First Nations, Canada, constitutional experts, municipalities, industry and Saskatchewan citizens test them. An arrangement based upon Honour Among Nations would contradict its own principles if Saskatchewan attempted to dictate every detail in advance. What Saskatchewan can do is put a serious proposition on the table.

Canada has federal jurisdiction and continuing Treaty responsibilities. Saskatchewan has substantial provincial jurisdiction and Crown responsibilities. Treaty First Nations possess constitutionally protected rights, enduring political identities and legitimate governmental aspirations. None of those propositions needs to be diminished for the others to be true. The challenge is to build institutions capable of holding them together. The question worth asking is whether Saskatchewan, Canada and Treaty First Nations can build something better than the arrangements they will otherwise inherit by default.

Appendix A: Draft Architecture of a Treaty Partnership and Major Projects Act

• Part I: Purpose, principles and non-derogation. Honour Among Nations; voluntary participation; no extinguishment; honour of the Crown preserved; funding not consent.

• Part II: Saskatchewan Treaty Council. Legislative status, accountability to the Speaker, Treaty-selected representation, secretariat, funding, ethics and technical independence.

• Part III: Participation agreements. Accession, scope, amendment, withdrawal, service continuity and contract protections.

• Part IV: Affected rights-holder process. Identification, notice, dispute resolution, project-specific panels and technical capacity.

• Part V: Self-government coordination. Recognition, delegation, concurrent regimes, service agreements and portability.

• Part VI: Treaty Fiscal Assignment. Defined royalty base, certification, payments, audit, volatility treatment and fiscal-consent firewall.

• Part VII: Designated mega-projects. Objective triggers, concept submission, committees, enabling Acts, material-change rule and preservation of technical permits.

• Part VIII: Early participation and remedies. Meaningful notice, participation opportunity, exceptions and treatment of interlocutory relief.

• Part IX: Consent and reconsideration. Consent record, reasons, provincial response, renewed hearings and Project Decision Record.

• Part X: Accountability and transition. Reporting, conflicts, access to information, independent review and consequential provisions.

Appendix B: Questions Requiring Expert Review

• How should the proposed reference questions be narrowed or tied to a concrete statutory framework?

• Which powers are best characterized as inherent or recognized jurisdiction, provincial delegation, federal authority or coordinated concurrent jurisdiction?

• What legal form can make the 20% fiscal assignment durable while preserving legislative sovereignty and budget accountability?

• How should qualifying net Crown natural-resource royalties be defined and certified?

• How should Equalization treatment respond to permanently assigned revenues and matching governmental responsibilities?

• What institutional tests should identify affected Treaty Nations for a designated mega-project?

• What limits can validly be placed on interlocutory relief after deliberate non-participation while preserving superior-court supervisory jurisdiction and section 35 remedies?

• How should an enabling Act relate to environmental assessment, utility approvals and municipal authority?

• What citizen remedies, audit requirements and conflict safeguards are appropriate for Treaty-government public finance?

• How should service portability and cross-border Treaty citizenship be addressed where Saskatchewan authority ends?

Appendix C: An Illustrative Path to Implementation

The following roadmap illustrates one possible sequence through which the concepts advanced in this paper could be examined and, if supported, progressively implemented. It is not intended to prescribe the negotiating process, sequence of decisions or timetable Saskatchewan, Canada or participating Treaty First Nations should adopt. Those matters properly belong to intergovernmental negotiation under Honour Among Nations.

1. Publish the Independent White Paper as a proposal for criticism, clearly identifying questions requiring expert review.

2. Commission independent constitutional, Treaty-law, fiscal, Indigenous-governance, municipal, environmental, utility and industry assessments.

3. Invite Saskatchewan to articulate an official constitutional position while making clear that it speaks only for itself.

4. Invite Canada and Treaty First Nations to provide their own positions and enter exploratory discussions without requiring endorsement of this model.

5. Develop a concrete draft Treaty Partnership and Major Projects Act, fiscal schedule and responsibility framework for evaluation.

6. If material uncertainty remains, consider a narrowly framed constitutional reference while negotiations continue.

7. Establish a joint design table to negotiate representation, affected-Nation identification, accountability, dispute resolution, fiscal principles and service responsibilities.

8. Pilot selected self-government fields chosen by participating Nations, with readiness, citizen protections and independent evaluation.

9. Pilot the designated mega-project process early enough that design alternatives remain real.

10. Negotiate the Treaty Fiscal Assignment with audited definitions, responsibility schedules, federal participation and agreed volatility protections.

11. Support Treaty-designed intergenerational investment institutions and human-capital partnerships as responsibilities develop.

12. Require periodic independent review and voluntary accession by additional Treaty Nations.

References and Legal Anchors

The authorities below provide constitutional, legal, fiscal and policy foundations relevant to this paper. Several institutional mechanisms proposed here, including the Treaty Council, Saskatchewan-specific Equalization accommodation and participation-based approach to interlocutory relief, are policy proposals developed in this paper rather than arrangements established by existing law.

A. Constitutional and Legal Authorities

Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982, especially sections 91(24), 92, 92A, 35 and 36.

Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, as constitutionally implemented for Saskatchewan.

Numbered Treaties applicable within Saskatchewan, together with relevant Treaty implementation materials.

Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73.

Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43.

Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44.

Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48.

Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., 2017 SCC 40.

Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., 2017 SCC 41.

Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40.

Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12.

RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, together with current jurisprudence governing interlocutory injunctions, judicial review, adequate alternative remedies and superior-court supervisory jurisdiction.

The Constitutional Questions Act, 2012 (Saskatchewan).

The Saskatchewan First Act.

B. UNDRIP, Self-Government and Federal Indigenous Policy

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, S.C. 2021, c. 14.

Government of Canada, United Nations Declaration Act Action Plan and implementation reporting.

Government of Canada, Collaborative Self-Government Fiscal Policy and policy materials concerning self-determination, self-government and alternatives to Indian Act governance.

C. Fiscal Federalism and Equalization

Department of Finance Canada, Equalization Program and technical materials concerning treatment of natural-resource revenues.

Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act and applicable regulations.

Government of Canada materials concerning the Quebec Abatement and historical federal-provincial tax arrangements.

D. Treaty, Indigenous-Government and Institutional Sources

Office of the Treaty Commissioner, materials concerning the numbered Treaties in Saskatchewan and the shared Treaty relationship.

First Nations University of Canada and University of Regina federation and governance materials.

The Saskatchewan Indian Institute of Technologies Act and SIIT governance and credentialing materials.

E. Saskatchewan Resource and Economic Context

Government of Saskatchewan materials concerning helium development, Crown dispositions, uranium, potash, critical minerals and strategic resource development.

Authoritative Canadian and allied-government technical materials concerning helium uses in semiconductor manufacturing, medicine, aerospace, scientific research, defence and strategic supply chains.

F. Matters Requiring Further Expert Verification

The participation-based restriction on interlocutory relief requires specific review by constitutional and administrative-law counsel before implementation.

The fiscal effects of the proposed 50%-to-60% Saskatchewan natural-resource revenue exclusion require modelling under the Equalization formula then in force.

The precise statutory definition and auditable calculation of qualifying net Crown natural-resource royalties require independent fiscal and legislative review.

Status and limitation: This is a persuasive policy draft, not a legal opinion, fiscal forecast, actuarial report or statement of any Treaty First Nation’s position. Current statutes, jurisprudence, fiscal formulas, government policies, resource statistics and institutional descriptions should be verified against authoritative sources before public publication.

Looking back at Saskatchewan’s economic history, a pattern quickly comes into view. We are a textbook example of what Canadian economic historian Harold Innis called the Staples Thesis: a region built around the extraction and export of raw commodities.

Innis wrote that commodity-rich regions can be trapped into path dependency. Capital and labour naturally flow toward primary extraction because it offers high returns and lower risk. Saskatchewan’s commodity export economy has left us vulnerable to external price shocks and makes it extremely difficult to diversify Saskatchewan into secondary manufacturing (processing) and tertiary industries (services, technology, and knowledge capital). Saskatchewan is living in the “Resource Curse.”

Recent geopolitical events and technological advances may open a door for tremendous economic opportunity for Saskatchewan. The stars are aligning for Saskatchewan in a way they haven’t for generations.

Global capital is shifting. European banks are seeking secure critical mineral pipelines and middle eastern sovereign wealth funds looking for stable, long-term infrastructure partnerships. The world is looking directly at Saskatchewan, and we need to position ourselves to capitalize on this window of opportunity.

The question for business leaders, policymakers, and academics must be: What more can we do to turn this moment into multi-generational economic resilience?

It has been said that Saskatchewan has been held back because it has too few people and too much geography. Navigating our unique geographic realities requires innovative structures. We cannot rely solely on public spending, nor can we leave structural diversification entirely to unguided market forces.

I believe that structured Public-Private Partnerships offer the most pragmatic bridge for now, leaving the door open for more market driven capital in the future. By pairing private sector efficiency and global capital with public oversight and strategic infrastructure investments, we ought to build the value-added processing and high-tech service sectors needed to process our resources right here at home.

As we design these partnerships, we have a responsibility to learn from two foundational traditions of the First Nations of Saskatchewan:

1. “Everyone gets a piece of the buffalo”: Capital investment cannot simply be about extracting value for outside shareholders. Economic growth must be evaluated through a clear lens: How does this investment directly benefit the people of Saskatchewan? Prosperity must be shared, inclusive, and community-sustaining.

2. The Seven Generations Framework: Strategic decisions must not be driven exclusively by quarterly earnings reports or four-year political cycles. We are stewards of this land and its resources, and therefore our economic architecture must account for the well-being of children and grand-children seven generations from today.

To be clear, I do not claim to have all (or any) of the answers.

What I do have are sparks of ideas that may inspire your hypotheses on how advances in technology, global capital shifts, and collaborative policy can help Saskatchewan overcome our geographical constraints and escape the cycle of boom-and-bust commodity dependence.

This Substack is intended to be a digital town hall for thinkers, builders, and leaders across the province. Together with you, I hope to test ideas, explore strategies, policy frameworks, and ask questions about where Saskatchewan goes next.

I hope you’ll join the conversation, challenge my assumptions, and help generate discussions that will shape our province’s future.

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